To prohibit the use of private security contractors and members of the Afghan Public Protection Force to provide security for members of the Armed Forces and military installations and facilities in…

Expresses the sense of Congress that: (1) the best possible security and force protection for members of the Armed Forces garrisoned and housed in Afghanistan (members) should be provided, (2) better security and force protection for such members can be provided by U.S. military personnel than by private security contractors or members of the Afghan Public Protection Force, (3) the President should take action in light of the increased risk to such members during the drawdown period and the increasing number of insider attacks, and (4) the United States remains committed to mission success in Afghanistan in light of the national security interests in the region and the sacrifice and commitment of the Armed Forces over the last ten years.

Prohibits funds appropriated to the Department of Defense (DOD) from being obligated or expended for: (1) entering into a contract for the performance of security-guard functions at a military installation or facility in Afghanistan at which members deployed to Afghanistan are garrisoned or housed, (2) otherwise employing private security contractors to provide security for such members, or (3) employing the Afghan Public Protection Force to provide such security or to perform security-guard functions at such a military installation or facility. Allows the President to waive such prohibition after a certification to Congress that the Afghan Public Protection Force or private security contractors can provide protection at least equal to that provided by the Armed Forces.

Directs the President to ensure that as many appropriately trained members of the U.S. Armed Forces as necessary are available to provide: (1) the security-guard functions at the installations and facilities at which members deployed to Afghanistan are garrisoned, (2) security for all members deployed to Afghanistan, and (3) counterintelligence support for such members.