A concurrent resolution expressing the sense of Congress on Iraq.

Expresses the sense of Congress that: (1) the Senate disagrees with the plan to augment our forces in Iraq by 21,500 and urges the President to consider all options for achieving the strategic goals set forth below; (2) the Senate believes the United States should continue operations in Anbar province, specifically for the purpose of combating an insurgency, including Al Qaeda associated elements, and denying terrorists a safe haven; (3) the Senate believes a failed state in Iraq would present a threat to regional and world peace, and the long-term U.S. security interests are best served by an Iraq that can govern and defend itself and serve as an ally in the war against extremists; (4) Congress should not take any action that will endanger U.S. military forces in the field, including the elimination or reduction of funds for such troops; (5) the primary objective of U.S. strategy in Iraq should be to encourage Iraqi leaders to make political compromises that will strengthen the unity government and lead to security improvements; (6) the military part of this strategy should focus on maintaining Iraq's territorial integrity, denying international terrorists a safe haven, conducting counterterrorism operations, promoting regional stability, supporting Iraqi efforts to bring greater security to Baghdad, and training and equipping Iraqi forces; (7) U.S. military operations should, as much as possible, be confined to these goals and should charge the Iraqi military with the primary mission of combating sectarian violence; (8) the military Rules of Engagement for this plan should reflect this delineation of responsibilities and the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff should clarify the command and control arrangements in Baghdad; (9) the U.S. government should transfer necessary military equipment to the Iraqi military; (10) the U.S. government should engage selected nations in the Middle East to develop a regional, internationally sponsored peace-and-reconciliation process for Iraq; (11) the Administration should provide regular updates to Congress; and (12) our overall military, diplomatic, and economic strategy should not be regarded as open-ended but rather as a new strategy conditioned upon the Iraqi government's meeting delineated benchmarks agreed to by the Iraqi Prime Minister.